Friday, April 24, 2026.
Colombia: Between Stability and Strain
Last week, we focused on Ecuador, a country navigating internal security challenges under President Noboa. This week, we turn to Colombia, where the conversation becomes more complex, and far more consequential for the region.
While open conflict between Ecuador and Colombia remains unlikely, the underlying tension between the two reflects something deeper. Political friction between President Daniel Noboa and President Gustavo Petro is not simply diplomatic, it highlights fundamentally different approaches to security, governance, and the management of transnational threats.
At the same time, Colombia is entering a critical electoral cycle.
With presidential elections scheduled for May 31, 2026, the country faces a highly fragmented political landscape with no clear front-runner. A runoff election is widely expected, reinforcing what many already understand: Colombia is not politically unified, instead it is navigating competing visions of its future.
For those less familiar with Colombia’s system, it is worth noting that President Gustavo Petro is not a candidate in this election, not by choice, but by law. Under Colombia’s constitutional framework, presidents are limited to a single four-year term with no immediate re-election. As a result, this election is not about Petro as a candidate, but about the continuation (or rejection) of his policies through those seeking to succeed him.
That distinction matters, because while Petro is not on the ballot, his presidency is.
This uncertainty is unfolding against the backdrop of President Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy, an ambitious effort to negotiate with armed groups while reshaping Colombia’s long-standing security posture. While the initiative reflects a shift in doctrine, it has also introduced operational ambiguity. Dissident factions, the ELN, and organized criminal groups continue to operate across key regions, often exploiting gaps created during transitional phases of negotiation and enforcement.
For those operating in or entering Colombia, this creates a paradox. The country is not in crisis, but neither is it fully stable. Its economic resilience, institutional framework, and attractiveness to foreign investment remain intact. Yet, security fragmentation, regulatory unpredictability, and electoral uncertainty introduce layers of risk that cannot be ignored.
The takeaway is straightforward: Colombia is not a “no-go” environment, but it is no longer a “set-and-forget” market. It is a country that demands attention, context, and informed decision-making.
Brett Mikkelson
Founder, B.M. Investigations, Inc. – Private Investigations in Panama
TOP NEWS and TIDBITS:
Government and the Ecuadorian–Colombian Chamber of Commerce Agreed to Establish a Working Group
The trade situation between Ecuador and Colombia, resulting from the imposition of fees and tariffs by both countries, was analyzed by members of the Ecuadorian–Colombian Chamber of Commerce (CAMECOL) and the Minister of Production, Foreign Trade and Investments, Luis Alberto Jaramillo.
According to the binational association, during the meeting—held Wednesday in Quito—the impact of the current tariff situation with Colombia was discussed with Minister Jaramillo. As a result, and according to a CAMECOL publication, a working group was agreed upon for technical follow-up.
Additionally, the association emphasized the importance of maintaining security without affecting the strategic commercial relationship.
Meanwhile, the Ministry reported that the dialogue focused on exploring opportunities for cooperation and identifying joint initiatives.
Ecuador began on February 1 to impose a 30% security surcharge on products imported from Colombia; this increased to 50% as of March 1, and will rise to 100% starting May 1 due to the Colombian government’s lack of implementation of control measures at the northern border.
For its part, Colombia imposed a 30% tariff on 73 subcategories of Ecuadorian products starting February 24. However, on February 27, it indicated it was considering increasing the tariff to 50% not only for those subcategories but also for additional products, though that proposal was not finalized.
It has now announced that starting May 1, tariffs will increase to 35%, 50%, and 75%. The new draft proposal includes 204 tariff subcategories subject to this three-tier structure.
The 75% tariff will apply to the majority—151 subcategories; the 50% tariff to 24 subcategories; and the 35% tariff to 29. Among the main affected products are shrimp, fish, beans, bananas, plantains, rice, palm oil, and cocoa.
Last Tuesday, Colombia’s Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Diana Morales, indicated that the decree would be signed this week. “It has already passed the Triple A Committee—customs, tariff, and foreign trade matters—it is currently under review, and it is possible that tomorrow it will be finalized, comments and observations reviewed, and then proceed to signing,” the minister told Colombian media.
Meanwhile, prior to the meeting between CAMECOL and Minister Jaramillo, in an interview with Ecuavisa, Freddy Cevallos, president of CAMECOL, stated they would request temporary compensation measures from the national government following the impact caused by tariff increases amid the trade dispute with Colombia. Key requests included tax deferrals and support for working capital costs.
“We do not want to go against the government’s position; in fact, we respect the president’s argument and background regarding insecurity. We also understand that trade cannot coexist with insecurity; we cannot expand markets if we have to pay extortion fees just to enter a new market or to carry out collections,” Cevallos stated.
Security in Colombia Slows Investment and Growth: The Structural Challenge Facing the Economy
Security in Colombia has evolved from a temporary issue into a structural constraint on economic development. Rising criminality not only affects public order but directly undermines the country’s competitiveness by increasing business operating costs, distorting markets, and discouraging investment—particularly in the most productive regions.
According to recent economic analyses by Corficolombiana, this deterioration has become one of the main factors limiting economic growth. The country faces a more diversified criminal ecosystem, operating with its own economic logic and competing unevenly with the formal sector.
In the global context, Colombia ranks among the countries with the highest levels of criminality. It holds second place in the Organized Crime Index, behind Myanmar, and is within the top 10 in terrorism, reaching its worst position since 2013 in 2025.
These indicators reflect not only the persistence of the phenomenon but also its increasing sophistication and adaptability, which complicates state control efforts.
Rising figures: kidnapping, homicides, and extortion on the rise
Recent statistics show a sustained deterioration in security conditions. In 2025, kidnappings increased by 123% compared to 2024 and by more than 300% compared to 2019. That same year, 13,726 homicides were recorded, while massacres resulted in 306 victims.
Extortion, meanwhile, has risen by more than 800% since 2010, consolidating itself as one of the crimes with the greatest impact on business activity.
The humanitarian impact is also significant: more than 1.6 million people were affected by the conflict in 2025—three times the figure recorded in 2024.
The trend not only continues but intensifies in 2026. During the first two months of the year, homicides reached their highest level for that period since 2015. Additionally, massacres increased by 13% in both number of incidents and victims, while kidnappings rose by 12%.
These figures confirm that insecurity continues to escalate and that current measures have not been sufficient to contain its advance.
Dispute Escalates Between Gustavo Petro and Daniel Noboa, Who Accuses Him of Ties to Drug Trafficker “Fito”
The president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, announced that he will file a criminal lawsuit against his counterpart from Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, for alleged defamation. Petro stated that during his visit to Manta—where he attended a presidential inauguration—he was provided security by the Ecuadorian military under Noboa’s orders, in addition to his Colombian security detail.
In his statement, the Colombian president said there are witnesses to his stay in Ecuador and questioned the suspicions surrounding his presence there, while also pointing to political pressure against him from opposition sectors and international actors.
The controversy arose after Noboa claimed that an investigation is underway regarding Petro’s stay in Manta in May 2025, an area where the criminal group Los Choneros operated.
This dispute is unfolding amid a tariff conflict in which Colombia imposed a 75% tariff on Ecuadorian products, while Ecuador raised its tariffs to 100%.
The Ecuadorian president suggested that the location where Petro allegedly stayed could have direct or indirect links to drug trafficking, although he acknowledged he could not confirm any meeting with drug lord José Adolfo Macías Villamar, alias “Fito.”
In response, Petro denied knowing the trafficker and stated that he has never had contact with him or his associates. “I do not know ‘Fito’ or his friends. I have only gone to Ecuador to attend presidential inaugurations,” he wrote on his X account.
He also defended Colombia’s judicial cooperation, stating that his government has captured and extradited Ecuadorian nationals linked to criminal activities.
Petro further criticized Noboa and certain political sectors, alleging pressure from the “far right” to link him to illicit activities. He also claimed that there are recordings of Ecuadorian authorities that would reveal a strategy to obtain testimony against him, mentioning the possible involvement of international actors such as the U.S. State Department.
From Ecuador, Noboa has insisted that the investigation is ongoing and emphasized the need to clarify the facts surrounding Petro’s visit.
This exchange of accusations marks a new episode of diplomatic tension between both governments, amid a regional context shaped by drug trafficking, security concerns, and political differences.
Petro also reiterated his request for former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas, who served under Rafael Correa, to be handed over to Colombia, claiming he remains in a state of “extreme malnutrition.”
In response, Noboa stated earlier in April that Ecuador “has waited years to see the corrupt face justice” and that “from abroad, they try to sell the narrative of ‘political prisoners’ to cover up what is evident”—that “there is a corrupt individual in prison who must answer to Ecuador.” He also referenced the Odebrecht case, describing it as a transnational corruption network that extended to Colombia, involving bribery in the 2012–2016 scandals.
In a recent interview with Semana, Noboa said he maintains a good relationship with Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella. Regarding Iván Cepeda, he expressed doubt that things would change, describing him as having a more ideological and hardline stance than Petro.
However, Noboa emphasized that he will respect “the decision of the Colombian people.” In response, Petro suggested that Noboa had interfered in Colombian politics and posted on X a photo of Abelardo de la Espriella with former drug trafficker Jorge Luis Hernández Villazón, alias “Boliche,” who is currently facing trial in the United States.
“These are the candidates that Daniel Noboa mentions,” Petro wrote, “as if he had the right to intervene in Colombia’s politics, which would also give me the right to do the same in Ecuador.”
Petro then accused Noboa of “supporting drug trafficking,” stating, “Here I can prove that Noboa supports drug trafficking in Colombia.”
The situation in Ecuador has also become a topic among Colombian political figures. Last week, Paloma Valencia visited Ipiales to address, among other issues, the impact of this diplomatic crisis on the local population.
Juan David Escobar, a geopolitics professor at EAFIT University, suggested that Noboa likely has grounds for his accusations; otherwise, he would not risk such a serious dispute with potential consequences for his country.
“The president of Ecuador would not engage in a conflict of this magnitude without substantial reasons,” he stated, adding that measures of this intensity typically go beyond standard diplomatic responses such as recalling an ambassador.
He also dismissed the idea that the dispute is merely a strategy to divert attention from domestic issues, concluding that it is “highly likely that there are sensitive matters behind this reaction, even if the full details are not yet known.”
From Insulting Shakira to Threatening Mayors: A String of Controversies in the Final Stage of Gustavo Petro’s Presidency
If it were fiction, it would not be believable. In a single intervention, President Gustavo Petro brought together Shakira, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, a parish priest from Bogotá, the country’s mayors and governors, and leaders of global powers.
What Colombians witnessed on Monday, April 14, during the most recent Cabinet meeting held in Ipiales, Nariño, bordered on the absurd. Over the course of four hours, the president issued threats and made outbursts on all fronts, with no thematic order whatsoever.
Petro had already accustomed the country to delivering lengthy speeches—many broadcast on both private and public channels—which later became fodder for mockery on social media. Over the past two years, these televised appearances have exposed a cabinet “in flames.”
At this stage, with only four months remaining in his term, the president appears to have no limits. The issue is no longer whether he controls the agenda, but rather the concern expressed across various sectors about his mental state.
The event was held at the Ecuadorian border to address measures for the region following Ecuador’s decision to impose 100% tariffs on Colombian products, as explained by the president. However, the meeting ultimately turned into a long discourse filled with philosophical references, remarks on sexuality, international accusations, and public order announcements.
The first thing that drew attention was the president’s appearance. He was completely covered—jacket, cap, scarf, and dark glasses—despite the meeting taking place at night. He justified this based on medical advice and added that he had seen “a lot of exuberant beauty.”
Government sources consulted offered no explanation for the use of dark glasses. There are unconfirmed rumors of additional cosmetic procedures.
The image itself was almost comical: the president issuing orders to his cabinet—many of them nearly impossible to fulfill within four months—while the camera showed officials looking confused and distressed.
Some ministers watched in astonishment. Others laughed awkwardly at poor jokes, almost involuntarily. Others, such as the Minister of Justice, remained unmoved, while others openly applauded him. Several ministers took careful notes, though at times their expressions revealed resignation.
In short, the entire cabinet appeared subject to the president’s mood that day.
That same Monday, at 1:00 a.m., the president posted a video created with artificial intelligence showing world leaders—including Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping—playing in an orchestra. Previously, Petro had also shared AI-generated videos of himself on X, portraying himself as Indiana Jones in the jungle.
What is Petro trying to achieve with all this? Some suggest it is a distraction amid the electoral process, but the pattern of repeated outbursts may point to something deeper: a display of power at its lowest expression.
In an interview, lawyer Ramiro Bejarano stated that Petro “believes being president is the same as being an emperor.” With less than four months left in office, that “emperor” continues to issue orders and statements as if his term were just beginning.
Petro vs Noboa, and an appeal to Trump
Petro’s first attacks were directed at President Daniel Noboa. According to Petro, Noboa’s border decisions are linked to drug trafficking.
“What Noboa is doing is handing the border over to the mafia,” Petro said, criticizing the closure of the road between Tumaco and Esmeraldas.
Despite the seriousness of the accusation, Petro asked Donald Trump to mediate with Ecuador to resolve the economic and political crisis, following Ecuador’s decision to impose 100% tariffs on Colombian goods citing border security concerns.
“I told Trump personally—mediate. He forgets things, so I’m asking him again: mediate so this doesn’t happen. Return to the idea of ending wars, not starting them,” Petro said.
From there, without any transition, he shifted to criticizing Colombia’s central bank, questioning its interest rate policy and labeling some members as “neoliberal, sectarian, and uribista.”
What does Shakira have to do with this?
Among the many remarks, one of the most striking included a reference to Shakira and one of her recent hits. Petro cited the phrase “women don’t cry, women make money” from her song, using it to make an unrelated point.
“The body is not for sale,” he said, arguing it should not be treated as a commodity. He then made explicit references to sexuality, stating that the clitoris and the penis are connected to the brain and that sexuality engages cognitive processes.
Late-night AI videos
Before attending the Cabinet meeting, Petro posted another unusual message at 1:00 a.m., accompanied by an AI-generated video showing global leaders playing instruments, while he appeared playing guitar and singing a classic Latin song.
It is unclear in what state he decided to publish the video. This is not the first time Petro has posted late at night—such actions nearly caused a diplomatic incident with the United States in early 2025.
Threats against mayors
During the same intervention, the president also warned mayors and local authorities that they could face detention if they supported road blockades.
“If mayors have to be jailed, they will be jailed,” he stated, insisting that roads must be cleared “by order of the President.”
He also suggested the possible use of a state of emergency, despite not having unilateral authority to impose such measures.
Mayors from cities such as Medellín, Cali, and Bogotá rejected these statements and criticized what they described as the president’s disregard for local governance.
Clash with a priest
Petro also referred to a priest from a Bogotá parish, accusing him of political messaging from the pulpit and even suggesting police intervention.
“If you don’t like it, stay silent,” Petro said, arguing that freedom of belief has limits when it intersects with politics.
He went further, calling the sermons “false” and stating that his family would stop attending the church. He concluded by asking the police to take action on the matter.
Foreign Minister of Colombia in Venezuela for Neighborhood Commission
The Foreign Ministry reported in a press release that the senior Colombian diplomat was received at Simón Bolívar International Airport by the Bolivarian Vice Minister for Latin America, Mauricio Rodríguez.
The statement noted that Villavicencio and Venezuela’s Foreign Minister, Yván Gil, will preside over the opening of the Third Binational Commission Meeting, with the aim of strengthening regional integration and peace.
The meeting will take place at the Casa Amarilla Antonio José de Sucre, headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where participants will also discuss ways to enhance economic and trade exchange between the two countries.
The source added that over the course of two days, 11 working groups will address areas of cooperation including culture and education; security and defense; trade, industry, and tourism; environmental and health issues; energy and hydrocarbons; among others.
